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DOUBLE FAULT: HOW THE NCAA’S NO-AGENT 
RULE SERVES LEGAL AND POLICY ERRORS INTO 
THE COURTS OF TENNIS 
Christopher M. Hartley 
I. INTRODUCTION
From the courts of law to the courts of policy, collegiate 
tennis is hamstrung by the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s (NCAA) no-agent rule.1  The casual college or 
professional tennis fan may not be aware of the problem as the 
visible effects of the rule tend to make it seem like it is more of 
an individual player’s problem rather than a major concern for 
NCAA member schools.  After all, it is the individual tennis 
player who loses a collegiate athletic opportunity if they violate 
the no-agent rule.2 
However, the hidden effects of the rule can also hinder 
college and university athletic departments in the form of 
potential losses of top-prospect student-athletes as well as 
squandered recruiting efforts.  The rule may also dissuade 
prospective collegiate tennis players from taking advantage of 
valuable career talent-management resources, resulting in a 
mutually unfavorable situation for the athletes, schools, and 
tennis profession.  As long as college remains an attractive option 
      Assistant Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy, West 
Point. The author is an active duty Army Judge Advocate. The views expressed here are the 
author’s personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, 
the United States Army, the United States Military Academy, or any other department or 
agency of the United States Government. 
1. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2018-2019 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Bylaw 12.3.1, at 71 (2018), [https://perma.cc/X7MZ-SD6T] [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s name, purpose, and fundamental policy are 
listed on page one of the NCAA Manual.   
2. See id. 
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for tennis players considering a professional career, this issue will 
remain relevant for all parties involved.3 
While the policy shortcomings of the NCAA’s no-agent rule 
are easier to articulate than the legal ones, the rule is not 
impervious to legal challenge.  Recent court cases suggest the 
road leading to successful challenges of the rule is at least 
becoming paved.4  Courts are entertaining criticism of the rule 
from prospective collegiate athletes who have fallen victim to it.5  
Scholarly articles critical of the rule have catalyzed policy 
adjustments.6  To be sure, the rumblings of discontent portend 
more changes in the future. 
To date, however, the NCAA’s no-agent rule still exists, and 
the NCAA has not exempted any one sport from the rule.7  If the 
call for complete abandonment of the rule has never been made, 
this Article engages that discussion and serves the proposal into 
the court of tennis.  Given the rule’s questionable policy effects 
on the sport of tennis, as well as the potential for increased legal 
and policy challenges as long as the rule exists, this Article calls 
for the outright removal of the NCAA’s no-agent rule for 
prospective collegiate tennis players. 
II. IN PURSUIT OF AMATEURISM: NCAA RULES
FACE SCRUTINY 
As the regulating body for many university and college 
athletic teams, the NCAA champions as one of its commitments 
the standard of “maintaining a line of demarcation between 
student-athletes who participate in the Collegiate Model and 
3. See Nina Pantic, College Has Helped Shape the Careers and Lives of Many Pro 
Players, Tᴇɴɴɪs.ᴄᴏᴍ, (Oct. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/XP64-U39G]. 
4. See, e.g., Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. App. 2004); Oliver v. NCAA,
920 N.E. 2d 203, 213-14 (Ohio C.P. Erie Cnty. 2009). 
5. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1992); Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at
213-14.
6. See, e.g., J. Winston Busby, Playing for Love: Why the NCAA Rules Must Require 
a Knowledge-Intent Element to Affect the Eligibility of Student-Athletes, 42 Cᴜᴍʙ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 
135, 149, 171-74 (2012); T. Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual 
Curveball at the NCAA’s “Veil of Amateurism,” 35 U. Dᴀʏᴛᴏɴ L. Rᴇᴠ. 175, 181, 188, 197-
98 (2010); Matthew Stross, The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring Amateurism, 2 Mɪss. 
Sᴘᴏʀᴛs L. Rᴇᴠ. 167, 172-73, 189 (2013). 
7. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Bylaw 12.3.1, at 71 (2019), [https://perma.cc/22WL-ZMFT] [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL, 
2019-2020].   
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athletes competing in the professional model.”8  Indeed, many 
sports fans choose to attend or watch intercollegiate athletics 
because collegiate athletes, who are not paid for their 
contributions to the university, are playing for the “love of the 
game” thus resulting in a more uncorrupted form of competition 
than their sports’ professional counterparts.9  For schools 
participating in Division I athletics, the NCAA’s “rulebook” is 
the NCAA Division I Manual (the Manual), which includes its 
constitution and bylaws.10  Much of the Manual’s contents are 
focused on the mission of preserving amateurism in collegiate 
athletics.11 
However, some NCAA rules that are focused on maintaining 
that line of demarcation have been criticized in recent sports law 
and law review articles.12  Often, critiques point out the 
inconsistencies when certain rules are applied to aspiring 
collegiate athletes who are considering the prospect of a 
professional athletic career in lieu of college.13  These arguments 
include claims that the interests of amateurism are not served by 
the rules or that the rules put the student-athletes in an unfair 
position because the student is not personally involved in an 
alleged rule infraction.14  Frequently, these discussions center 
around the NCAA’s no-agent rule, which forecloses a student-
athlete’s eligibility to compete at the intercollegiate level if they 
have ever received the services of an agent.15 
This Article further develops the critiques of the NCAA no-
agent rule and examines the issue through the lens of collegiate 
and professional tennis.  Tennis is uniquely situated in this debate 
because it is arguably the NCAA sport in which its college-bound 
athletes flirt with the prospect of “going pro” at an earlier age than 
athletes in other NCAA sports.16  Whether a football or basketball 
8. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at xii.
9. See Saul Pink, Why College Football Players Shouldn’t Get Paid, INT’L Dᴀᴛᴇʟɪɴᴇ
(Dec. 7, 2017), [https://perma.cc/JP4H-C73R]. 
10. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii-v, 8. 
11. See id. at xii. 
12. See Busby, supra note 6, at 141, 148-49; Stross, supra note 6, at 172-73, 178.
13. See Lockhart, supra note 6; Stross, supra note 6, at 169, 171, 180-81.
14. See Busby, supra note 6; Stross, supra note 6, at 173, 177-78, 184. 
15. See Busby, supra note 6, at 148-49; Lockhart, supra note 6, at 181; Stross, supra 
note 6. 
16. See, e.g., Ben Rothenberg, Path to Pros Rarely Crosses Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
10, 2013, at D6 [hereinafter Rothenberg, Path to Pros]; Ben Rothenberg, Some Chafe at 
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player’s skills will give them a solid chance to compete in the 
professional ranks is often not fully realized until they enter 
collegiate athletic competition.  For baseball, the process starts 
earlier, with many high school players discovering they have 
professional potential during their high school years such that a 
decision to forego a collegiate baseball career and directly enter 
professional baseball’s minor leagues is a relatively common 
occurrence.17 
In tennis, that professional aspiration and preparation 
process also starts earlier than in many other sports that field 
teams in intercollegiate competition.18  Tennis players desiring to 
play at the elite collegiate level have been known to start to 
playing tennis as early as the age of three, compete in junior 
tournaments as early as thirteen, and compete in professional 
tournaments (where cash prizes are awarded) as early as 
fourteen.19  The key part about the previous sentence is that it 
pertains to aspiring collegiate tennis players.  But it could have 
just as easily referred to aspiring professional tennis players.  That 
is because both sets of players engage in the exact same things at 
the same young age.  In addition to the previously mentioned 
Rules Meant to Protect Youngest Girls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2017, at D2; Jim Brockman, 
Chang Captures Battle of Sophies, HERALD-TRIBUNE (May 23, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/WD4G-DDTW]. 
17. See Probability of Playing College and Professional Baseball, HIGH SCH.
BASEBALL WEB, [https://perma.cc/GYZ7-UQKH] (last visited Sept. 16, 2019), for statistics 
revealing that while going from high school baseball directly to the professional ranks is still 
a slim probability, it is more likely to happen than in other sports, such as basketball and 
football.  See also Stross, supra note 6, at 183-84 (explaining how baseball’s minor league 
system that many aspiring professionals enter demands a different standard of amateurism 
than other sports).  
18. See Rothenberg, Path to Pros, supra note 16.  Part of this dynamic is fueled by the 
fact that tennis is largely an individual sport, whereas collegiate tennis is one of the few 
places where tennis is played both as an individual sport and a team competition.  
19. See, e.g., INT’L TENNIS FED’N, 2019 ITF WORLD TENNIS TOUR JUNIORS REGS. 82-
83 (2019), [https://perma.cc/Y63Z-US7D]; INT’L TENNIS FED’N, 2019 MEN’S & WOMEN’S 
ITF WORLD TENNIS TOUR REGS. 138-39 (2019), [https://perma.cc/6PH2-NP3K] 
[hereinafter 2019 ITF MEN’S & WOMEN’S REGULATIONS]; ATP, THE 2019 ATP OFFICIAL 
RULEBOOK 91 (2019), [https://perma.cc/7TH7-878G] (listing the rules and regulations of the 
Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP)); WOMEN’S TENNIS ASS’N, 2019 WTA OFFICIAL 
RULEBOOK 253-56 (2019), [https://perma.cc/569Q-J7MU] (listing the Women’s Tennis 
Association’s (WTA) rules).  To be eligible to compete in the ITF World Tennis Tour Juniors 
competition, per ITF’s regulations, players must be between the ages of thirteen and 
eighteen.  Players can earn ranking points but are not eligible to win cash prizes in junior 
tournaments.  ITF World Tour, ATP, and WTA, all require players to be at least fourteen 
years old.  It is at this level of tournament play that players are eligible to win cash prizes.  
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activities, both types of tennis players hire personal coaches, 
enroll in and train at elite tennis academies, and seek specialized 
schooling at a very young age in order to facilitate the many on-
court hours required just to be competitive in both the collegiate 
and professional domains.20 
For both classes of young athletes, the factors that weigh into 
the decision of whether one’s tennis career might evolve into a 
full-time profession are present during these formative years. 
While the young tennis player does not have to decide to go pro 
by a certain age, preparations must start early if that option is to 
remain on the table.21  One of the common items of preparation 
for the more talented young tennis players is to hire an agent: an 
action which, under current NCAA rules, forecloses any prospect 
of eventually competing in intercollegiate tennis if the 
professional career fails to materialize.22  To be sure, players that 
reach the elite professional ranks usually display the promise that 
would inspire hiring an agent at a very young age.23 
This Article proposes a change to the NCAA no-agent rule 
with respect to tennis.  It urges the NCAA to abandon the no-
agent rule for tennis players who have yet to matriculate into a 
college or university, but to continue applying the rule to athletes 
currently competing in NCAA athletics. 
To provide valuable perspective, Part III of this Article 
describes the environment of lower-level professional tennis 
tournaments in which both high school and collegiate players 
participate.  Further illustrating this process and showcasing the 
effect of the no-agent rule, Part IV introduces the story of two 
tennis players whose collegiate tennis aspirations were foreclosed 
20. See Rothenberg, Path to Pros, supra note 16 (quoting Nicole Gibbs, who describes 
the minimal differences between the quality of play in college and professional tennis); see 
also Kamakshi Tandon, More to Rafa Than Meets the Eye, ESPN (Aug. 26, 2011), 
[https://perma.cc/Y27L-BR5W] (noting that Rafael Nadal, now a highly successful 
professional tennis player, attended a sports boarding school at a young age).  
21. See generally U.S. Tennis Ass’n, The Progressive Development of a High 
Performance Player, UTSA: PLAYER DEV., [https://perma.cc/ES2Q-J8TG] (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2019); Rothenberg, Path to Pros, supra note 16.  
22. See Al Roth, Junior Tennis Players: Turn Pro or Go to College?, MKT. DESIGN
(Sept. 30, 2010), [https://perma.cc/8A62-597S] (discussing the agent feeding frenzy at junior 
tennis tournaments). The article also explains how European players do not enjoy collegiate 
rule structure to help protect them from that frenzy.  See also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 
1.  
23. See Roth, supra note 22.
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by the rule.  Part V sets up the legal and policy questions to be 
addressed.  Part VI outlines the NCAA rules applicable to tennis 
players who have earned money at tournaments and/or hired an 
agent.  Part VII highlights several critiques of the no-agent rule 
set forth by various law journals.  Part VIII explores the general 
contract law issues at play when a prospective professional tennis 
player hires an agent.  Part IX highlights several court decisions 
that address the no-agent and other NCAA eligibility rules.  Part 
X then discusses the follow-on policy problems resulting from the 
contract law conundrum created by the no-agent rule and whether 
the rule serves its intended purpose.  Finally, part XI proposes 
changes to the NCAA’s no-agent rule with respect to the sport of 
tennis. 
III. THE TENNIS “MINOR LEAGUES”
Charlottesville, Virginia, is just one of many small cities 
across the United States that hosts professional tennis 
tournaments.24  The city hosts a men’s tournament in October and 
a women’s event in April.25  These tournaments are part of a 
“circuit” of tournaments that occur across the United States and 
around the world literally twelve months out of the year.26  The 
United States Tennis Association (USTA) regulates the events 
that occur in the United States, known as the “Pro-Circuit,”27 
while the International Tennis Federation (ITF) sanctions all such 
tournaments held around the world.28  Worldwide, there can be as 
many as ten or more of these tournaments occurring the same 
24. See generally 2019 USTA Men’s Competitive Pathway Calendar, UTSA
[https://perma.cc/ACJ7-JS6C] (last updated June 21, 2019) [hereinafter UTSA, 2019 Men’s 
Calendar] (the cities hosting men’s professional tournaments in 2019 includes Norman, 
Oklahoma, and Champaign, Illinois); 2019 USTA Women’s Competitive Pathway Calendar, 
UTSA [https://perma.cc/6Q6N-8882] (last updated Sept. 26, 2019) [hereinafter UTSA, 2019 
Women’s Calendar]  (the cities hosting women’s professional tournaments in 2019 includes 
Midland, Michigan and Pelham, Alabama).  
25. See UTSA, 2019 Men’s Calendar, supra note 24, and UTSA, 2019 Women’s 
Calendar, supra note 24, for the complete UTSA Pro Circuit men’s and women’s schedules. 
26. U.S. TENNIS ASS’N, 2019 USTA PRO CIRCUIT PROGRAM 1, 7 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/A7TW-PNRM] [hereinafter UTSA PROGRAM]. 
27. Id. at 7. 
28. For the full listings of the International Tennis Federation’s world-wide schedules 
and results, see INT’L TENNIS FED’N, [https://perma.cc/SB5G-E3L7] (last visited Sept. 29, 
2019).  
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week.29 These are the “minor leagues” of professional tennis.  The 
level of the tournament is influenced by the prize money 
available, and the tournaments field players who generally have 
world rankings of 100 through 1,000 and beyond.30 
While attending a tournament like the one in Charlottesville 
as a spectator, several things stand out.  First, there are rarely any 
crowds and typically only a handful of fellow spectators.31  
Indeed, some tennis matches go on without anyone courtside 
watching save for the occasional coach and the player’s host 
family.32  Many of the players stay with these host families who 
are members of the tournament’s tennis facility venue.33  The 
tennis club facility hosting the tournament asks for volunteers 
amongst its members to house the players while they participate 
in the tournament as a lodging cost-saving measure to the 
players.34 
The hallways of the indoor sections of the tennis facility are 
lined with players sitting on any available seats or the floor, with 
their tennis gear by their side, as they await their next match or 
practice session.35  All the while, the chatter between the players 
often entails asking each other whether they will participate in the 
following week’s tournament, often a few states away, how they 
plan to travel to that tournament, and if they are amenable to 
sharing a ride.36  Frugality is the watchword; there are no fancy 
cars, and players often avoid staying at local hotels because it is 
simply too expensive.37  Make no mistake, this is an expensive 
endeavor.  However, the money that is spent by the players goes 
to ensuring they have good equipment (their racquets), paying for 
coaches, funding their travel to the various tournaments, as well 
29. Id. 
30. See generally INT’L TENNIS FED’N, Rankings List, ITF, [https://perma.cc/G37A-
DHQW] (last updated Sept. 23, 2019). 
31. David Waldstein, The Lonely Road to Tennis Glory, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2017, at 
D1 [hereinafter Waldstein, The Lonely Road]. 
32. See id.; see also David Waldstein, Tennis’s Lowest Pro Rung Offers Little Reward, 
but Thousands Play On, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2017, at SP1 [hereinafter Waldstein, 
Thousands Play On].  The author of the present article supplements the cited descriptions of 
professional tennis tournaments with some of his own personal observations.   
33. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
34. See id.
35. See id. 
36. See id.
37. See id.
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as paying for food—more expensive than meets the eye as these 
are diets of elite athletes who engage in some form of fitness or 
tennis training many hours a day.38 
The purpose of this description is to paint a clearer, and often 
unseen, picture of the lives of most professional tennis players. 
This is not the world of elite players like Roger Federer or Serena 
Williams, though Roger and Serena recognizably started their 
careers in similar venues.39  Further, this is probably not what the 
casual tennis fan envisions a tennis tournament would look like; 
all casual fans have seen is the television produced glitz and 
glamor of one of tennis’s four “grand slams” (tennis lexicon for 
one of the four largest “major tournaments” in the world: 
Wimbledon, Roland Garros (French Open), Australian Open, and 
U.S. Open).40  Those who only tune in to the semifinals or finals 
of a major tournament like Wimbledon or the U.S. Open will 
recognize few, if any, of the names of players at these Pro Circuit 
tournaments.  The difference between a typical tennis tournament 
at the Pro Circuit level and one of the grand slams is an off-the-
chart magnitude, not just in terms of prize money involved.41  One 
who attends the U.S. Open after attending only Pro Circuit events 
will be overwhelmed at the Open’s size, while one who has only 
attended grand slam events and decides to check out a Pro Circuit 
tournament will wonder if they are at an actual tennis tournament 
at all.42 
Some of the players participating in Pro Circuit tournaments 
are chipping their way up the world rankings and some are sliding 
38. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31; see also ASS’N PRESS, Slams Pay 
Bills for Rank-and-File Players, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2016, at SP10; Doree Lewak, These 
U.S. Open Tennis Pros Are Pretty Much Broke, N.Y. POST (Aug. 26, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/D6PC-RWEB].  
39. See generally History, ROGER FEDERER, [https://perma.cc/ED4M-Q58M] (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2019) (listing a year-by-year history of Roger Federer’s career); Serena 
Williams, WTA, [https://perma.cc/7DNB-T33R] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (outlining 
Serena Williams’s career).  
40. Grand Slam Overview, ITFTENNIS, [https://perma.cc/KF5D-BTMH] (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2019). 
41. Compare 2019 U.S. Open Prize Money, US OPEN, [https://perma.cc/DP9E-9HSQ]
(the available prize money for men’s and women’s singles in the 2019 U.S. Open totaled 
$42,860,000), with UTSA PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 46-47 (listing the prize money 
awarded in USTA Pro Circuit events for 2018, ranging from $25,000 to $100,000).   
42. See 2019 U.S. Open Sets All-Time Attendance Record, US OPEN,
[https://perma.cc/3RHQ-AF6L] (Sept. 8, 2019) (2019 U.S. Open attendance totaled 
853,227); see also Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.  
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down.43  A few will make a meteoric rise to the elite rankings of 
world tennis.  Some are mid-teens who are training at elite tennis 
academies.44  Others are collegiate players taking the opportunity 
to see how they measure up against the rising professionals.45  
Still, others may have been competitive enough to play on the big 
stage at one point in their careers, but this is the level at which 
they are able to compete: just playing for the love of the game.46  
Collegiate players test the waters at these tournaments to see if 
they want to pursue a professional career upon graduation.47  Pre-
collegiate players (juniors) often find themselves deciding 
whether to forgo college and immediately pursue the professional 
path. 
With all the differences between the players who participate 
in these lower-level tournaments, there is one common 
denominator: while playing in these tournaments, the players 
generally are not making more money than they are spending on 
the sport, given the high costs of travel and the relatively meager 
tournament prize money available at this level.48  Of course, that 
is assuming the player advances far enough in any given 
tournament to see a measurable fraction of that tournament’s total 
“purse” of prize money.49 
The bottom line is, this is the often unseen and tough 
underbelly of professional tennis.  It is the rough and tumble 
world of tennis’s minor leagues: a place where most players will 
not make it to the tennis elite but continue playing with the 
competitive fire necessary to get a chance at that level, and if for 
nothing else, to play for the love of the game.  Players are 
43. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
44. Tennis Program, IMG ACAD., [https://perma.cc/9MFV-Y8KM] (last visited Sept. 
29, 2019).  
45. David Waldstein, As Tennis Tries to Thin Its Pro Ranks, the College Game May
Suffer, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), [https://perma.cc/E952-4GSM] [hereinafter Waldstein, 
The College Game].  
46. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31. 
47. See Waldstein, The College Game, supra note 45. 
48. See, e.g., ASS’N PRESS, supra note 38; Lewak, supra note 38; Michael Bane & 
Danielle Gescheit, Rich Rewards for Those at the Top in Tennis, but What of the Rest?, THE 
CONVERSATION (Jan. 18, 2015, 2:21 PM), [https://perma.cc/2L5V-6DNU]; Waldstein, 
Thousands Play On, supra note 32; Miguel Morales, How the 92nd-Ranked Tennis Player 
in the World Earns a Comfortable Living, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2013), [https://perma.cc/EAF2-
WZYV]; Wayne A. Grove, et al., Why So Many Tennis Players Go Pro Even Though Few 
‘Make it,’ THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 4, 2018, 3:32 PM), [https://perma.cc/S2F3-9YHS]. 
49. See Morales, supra note 48.
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typically ranked outside of the world’s top 100, and there are few 
endorsements to help with expenses.50 After all, who wants to 
invest in a player who will not even draw more than a handful of 
fans at any given tournament and get little to no media air time? 
If endorsements do exist, they are usually in the form of 
equipment sponsorships to, at minimum, help the players afford 
their tennis racquets.51  Many tennis players spend an entire career 
playing in tennis’s minor leagues, not dissimilar to baseball’s 
minor leagues.52 
IV. THE STORY OF TWO RISING TENNIS STARS
To show how the NCAA’s no-agent rule can play a pivotal 
and disruptive role in the life of a tennis player going through this 
process, introductions are necessary for Maria Genovese (nee 
Shishkina) and Katerina Stewart.  For similar, yet individually 
different reasons, Maria and Katerina are case studies for why the 
no-agent rule needs to be abolished. 
Maria Genovese was a child tennis prodigy growing up in 
Kazakhstan.53  Her coaches and parents alike knew at a young age 
that she was endowed with tennis talents that could launch her 
onto the world stage of elite tennis.54  Not having the type of local 
training facility necessary to challenge and develop Maria’s 
talents, her mother sold her business in Kazakhstan to accompany 
Maria to the IMG Academy in Bradenton, Florida.55  It was 
certainly a risk; after all, Maria was only seven years old, but all 
indications pointed to her being the real deal.56  By the age of 
eleven, she signed a scholarship deal to train at IMG Academy.57  
Shortly thereafter she signed a sponsorship deal with Under 
50. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
51. See id. 
52. See Morales, supra note 48; Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
53. See, e.g., Lindsay Berra, Future Shock, ESPN THE MAG (June 15, 2010), 
[https://perma.cc/ZX9B-MDRH]; Telephone Interview with Maria Genovese, Student, Tyler 
Community College (Apr. 22, 2018); E-mail from Maria Genovese, Student, Tyler 
Community College, to author (Jan. 10, 2019, 15:42 EST) (on file with author).   
54. See Berra, supra note 53.
55. Telephone Interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53; see also Berra, supra
note 53. 
56. See Berra, supra note 53. 
57. See id.
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Armour.58  Maria’s junior tennis world ranking cracked the top 
100 by the time she was fourteen.59  It appeared the risk was 
destined to pay off. 
However, two unfortunate and untimely wrist injuries and 
surgeries stifled her career.60  Because of the gap in playing time 
to tend to the injuries, she lost her ranking, sponsors, and agents.61  
When she resumed play, she found it difficult to regain the footing 
she once had.  Her ranking flat lined, and she found herself at a 
crossroads: whether she could afford to continue to pursue a 
professional career or whether, instead, instead she could go to 
college, where, despite her depressed world rankings, she still had 
the talent to earn a scholarship for tennis and compete at a high-
level in the NCAAs.62 
However, due to the NCAA’s no-agent rule, it turned out 
Maria could not afford the collegiate route.  The NCAA deemed 
her ineligible to compete in NCAA governed intercollegiate 
athletics due to her agency and sponsorship deals, in direct 
violation of the rule.63 Even with agency, sponsorship, and partial 
scholarship to the IMG Academy helping with her tennis 
expenses up to that point, Maria did not have enough money to 
afford college without scholarship help.64  The scholarship help 
she would have relied upon was an athletic scholarship to play 
intercollegiate tennis.  So instead of pursuing a four-year degree, 
Maria enrolled at Tyler Junior College in Texas.65  This was a far 
cry from where Maria and her family envisioned things would end 
up after uprooting from Kazakhstan and moving to the United 
States.66 
58. Mic Huber, Shishkina Picking Up the Pieces, HERALD-TRIB. (Mar. 26, 2016), 
[https://perma.cc/5UGV-2JUV]. 
59. Telephone Interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53; Huber, supra note 58. 
60. Huber, supra note 58.
61. Id. 
62. Telephone interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53. 
63. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1. 
64. Telephone interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53. 
65. Id.  See generally Phil Hicks, NJCAA Tennis: ASA Miami Edges TJC, Hillsborough 
for National Title, TYLER MORNING TELEGRAPH (May 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/CJ9H-
R58U]. 
66. Upon completely two years at Tyler Junior College, Maria is now playing NAIA
level tennis at Georgia Gwinnett College.  2019-20 Women’s Tennis Roster, GEORGIA 
GWINNETT GRIZZLIES, [https://perma.cc/N8XC-G6SY] (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
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Katerina Stewart represents a similar occasion where the no-
agent rule foreclosed a collegiate tennis option.  Katerina, a rising 
young American tennis star, was the runner-up in the 
Charlottesville tournament in 2015 and had skyrocketed to a 
world ranking of 158 that summer.67  Her ranking allowed her to 
play in the qualifying rounds of the four biggest stages of 
professional tennis between 2014 and 2016: the major 
tournaments of Wimbledon, U.S. Open, French Open, and 
Australian Open.68  Indeed, she was on nearly every short list of 
young American tennis player on the rise.69 
 However, not only did Katerina make the tough decision to 
go to college and get a degree, thus putting her promising 
professional career on hold for four years, she made a bold and 
honorable choice to join the military by enrolling in the United 
States Military Academy Preparatory School, a one-year program 
which upon successful completion leads to appointment to the 
four-year program at the United States Military Academy at West 
Point.70  Not only was Katerina’s professional tennis career on 
hold during college, but the West Point’s five-year active duty 
service requirement upon graduation meant that she would have 
to put off any realistic hope of continuing her professional tennis 
career for a total of nine years.71  Still, she would be able to fulfill 
her dream of serving in her country’s military while at the same 
time competing with the Army West Point Women’s Tennis 
Team.72 
Or so she thought.  While reviewing Katerina’s records to 
determine how much playing eligibility she would have once 
entering the military academy’s four-year program—it was 
initially thought she would have to sit out one year due to 
academic ineligibility because of the alternative, online schooling 
67. Cindy Shmerler, ‘Cadet Candidate Wimbledon’: A Tennis Star Enlists Her Backup 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/4J26-VD85]; see also Rick Vach, 
Tennis Briefs: USTA French Wild Card Race; Florida Cup Results, USTA FLA. (May 5, 
2015), [https://perma.cc/ZM76-8R2B]. 
68. Tennis Australia: Grand Slams, TENNIS, [https://perma.cc/7SP7-WTM8] (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
69. See Patrick Sauer, Katerina Stewart Quit Pro Tennis for the Army, Will It Derail 
Her Career?, VICE (Aug. 24, 2016), [https://perma.cc/FY9C-YXJZ]. 
70. See Schmerler, supra note 66.
71. Your Career After West Point, WEST POINT, [https://perma.cc/DH57-NRGJ] (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
72. See Schmerler, supra note 66. 
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she completed while training for tennis—West Point’s 
compliance office learned that Katerina’s parents had previously 
hired an agent to help them navigate their daughter’s promising 
professional career.73  It was not that anyone tried to hide that 
information, and it was disclosed when inquired about, but it was 
something that Katerina and her parents did not think would 
matter in terms of her playing tennis at the collegiate level.74  
West Point’s compliance office then advised Katerina and her 
parents that the NCAA was very strict about the no-agent rule and 
even if appealed, it was a very real possibility that the NCAA 
would deem Katerina ineligible to compete for all four years of 
her Academy enrollment.75 
While Katerina still wanted to serve in the military, the 
thought of not being able to compete in tennis for her four 
collegiate years before her five-year service commitment and 
sitting on the sidelines unable to support her fellow cadets 
competing in collegiate tennis was just too much.76  Ultimately, 
she decided to disenroll from the military academy prepatory 
school and resume her pro career.77  It was a bold move to serve 
her country in the first place, and perhaps Katerina could still 
pursue that option in the future, but it would have to be a dream 
deferred. 
73. Interview with Katerina Stewart, Sanchez Casel Tennis Academy, in Naples, Fla. 
(June 1, 2018); Interview with Army West Point Intercollegiate Athletics Compliance 
Office, in West Point, N.Y.; Interview with Paul Peck, Head Coach, Army West Point 
Women’s Tennis, in West Point, N.Y.  See Steve Navaroli, Making Return to Tennis, 
Katerina Stewart Finds Her Outlook Has Shifted, LANCASTER ONLINE (Aug. 10, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/8TJ8-9PE3] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).  
74. Interview with Katerina Stewart, supra note 72; see Navaroli, supra note 72.
75. Id. 
76. Interview with Katerina Stewart, supra note 72.  Author’s note: Regarding Katerina 
Stewart’s decision upon hearing she would likely be ineligible to play college tennis: West 
Point champions the notion that its admitted cadets show incredible potential for increased 
potential in four “pillars”: military, academic, physical, and character.  A well-rounded, 
admitted cadet would ideally show great potential in all four pillars, yet almost every cadet 
can point to one or two of those pillars that is their “strong suit,” which most likely catapulted 
their overall applicant file to an offer for admission.  For Katerina, that strong suit was her 
athletic prowess on the tennis court, proving her propensity for potential in the physical 
pillar, having proved she could eventually compete at a very high professional level but 
opting for college.  For the Academy, Katerina’s strongest contribution to the Corps of 
Cadets would be in the physical pillar through her athletic abilities in the sport of tennis.  
However, the NCAA no-agent rule disqualified her from intercollegiate competition 
rendering her unable to participate in the sport that made her stand out in the physical pillar.  
77. See Navaroli, supra note 72. 
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V. BREAK POINT: THE ISSUE
This leads to the crux of the problem: the no-agent rule 
profoundly affects the decision-making process of some tennis 
players aspiring to compete at high levels and disqualifies others 
who were not aware of the prohibition.  The simplest question is, 
is it a fair rule? From a legal perspective, is there some type of 
recourse that could have changed the outcomes for these two 
athletes or others?  Neither Maria or Katerina, nor their parents, 
were acting nefariously when hiring agents.  Nor were the parents 
trying to sabotage the career options of their children.  To the 
contrary, these parents were acting in their children’s best 
interests.  Their children’s coaches and trainers advised them that 
their daughters possessed pro-level talents; the players 
themselves wanted to continue to compete and seek the next level; 
and the parents were new to this process and needed help 
navigating the unfamiliar waters of a child’s budding pro-tennis 
career.78  Additionally, the parents wanted to ensure their children 
had a professional voice representing them to help stave off any 
attempts to exploit their child’s talents.79 
Did these families know the agency agreement would 
foreclose the potential option of their child competing in NCAA 
athletics?  Was that eventuality even on their radar screen?  Did 
their children, the beneficiaries of the agency relationship, know 
it could foreclose a tennis playing option down the road?  Could 
the child even be expected to have the maturity and life 
experience to make the agency agreement decision or draw the 
unforeseen conclusions that their parents were unable to draw? 
The answer to all these questions is obviously no,80 which 
sets up the questions this Article attempts to answer.  Is there a 
viable legal recourse for these families and should there be a 
policy change to avoid putting future unwitting tennis players in 
the unenviable position of being deemed ineligible for collegiate 
competition based on their or their families’ benign actions years 
ago?  The legal question sets up a classic contract law discussion. 
The policy question then explores whether the potential legal 
pitfalls of the rule beg for the rule’s elimination.  This discussion 
78. See generally Schmerler, supra note 66; Berra, supra note 53. 
79. See Schmerler, supra note 66; Berra, supra note 53.
80. Id. 
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is informed by the analysis of whether the goal of preserving 
amateurism in the world of tennis is really served by the no-agent 
rule. 
IV. THE CODE: RELEVANT NCAA RULES
REGULATING PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES 
An examination of the NCAA bylaws regarding collegiate 
athlete eligibility in the context of sports agents requires a look at 
how the NCAA defines an agent: 
An agent is any individual who, directly or indirectly: 
(a) Represents or attempts to represent an individual for the
purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation
for financial gain; or (b) Seeks to obtain any type of financial
gain or benefit from securing a prospective student-athlete’s
enrollment at an educational institution or from a student-
athlete’s potential earnings as a professional athlete.  An
agent may include, but is not limited to, a certified contract
advisor, financial advisor, marketing representative, brand
manager or anyone who is employed or associated with such
persons.81
Further, the NCAA no-agent rule states the following: 
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an 
intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in 
writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of 
marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that 
sport.  Further, an agency contract not specifically limited in 
writing to a sport or particular sports shall be deemed 
applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible 
to participate in any sport.82 
Note that this no-agent rule does not require one to have a 
written contract with or make any payments to an agent to result 
in violation of the rule.  Immediately following the general rule is 
Bylaw 12.3.1.1, a recently revised exception that accommodates 
high school agency contracts by baseball and men’s ice hockey 
players: 
In baseball and men’s ice hockey, prior to full-time 
collegiate enrollment, an individual who is drafted by a 
81. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.02.1, at 61.
82. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1. 
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professional baseball or men’s ice hockey team may be 
represented by an agent or attorney during contract 
negotiations.  The individual may not receive benefits (other 
than representation) from the agent or attorney and must pay 
the going rate for the representation.  If the individual does 
not sign a contract with the professional team, the agreement 
for representation with the agent or attorney must be 
terminated prior to full-time collegiate enrollment.83 
Bylaw 12.1.2.4, “Exceptions to Amateurism Rule,” also 
provides accommodations for tennis players, but the exception 
involves acceptance of prize money at tournaments and does not 
relieve these players from NCAA athletic disqualification due to 
hiring an agent: 
In tennis, prior to full-time collegiate enrollment, an 
individual may accept up to $10,000 per calendar year in 
prize money based on his or her place finish or performance 
in athletics events.  Such prize money may be provided only 
by the sponsor of an event in which the individual 
participates.  Once the individual has accepted $10,000 in 
prize money in a particular year, he or she may receive 
additional prize money on a per-event basis, provided such 
prize money does not exceed the individual’s actual and 
necessary expenses for participation in the event.  The 
calculation of actual and necessary expenses shall not 
include the expenses or fees of anyone other than the 
individual (e.g., coach’s fees or expenses, parent’s 
expenses).84 
In tennis, after initial full-time collegiate enrollment, an 
individual may accept prize money based on his or her place 
finish or performance in an athletics event.  Such prize money 
may not exceed actual and necessary expenses and may be 
provided only by the sponsor of the event.  The calculation of 
actual and necessary expenses shall not include the expenses or 
fees of anyone other than the individual (e.g., coach’s fees or 
expenses, family member’s expenses).85 
83. Id. at Bylaw 12.3.1.1.
84. Id. at Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2.1, at 66.
85. Id. at Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2.2.
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Taking a step back and examining what the no-agent rule 
attempts to achieve requires a look at one of the “dominant” 
principles, Principle 2.9, the NCAA Manual highlights: 
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate 
sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily 
by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits 
to be derived.  Student participation in intercollegiate 
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be 
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial 
enterprises.86 
Of the “Commitments to the Division I Collegiate Model,” 
this no-agent rule most closely relates to “The Commitment to 
Amateurism”: 
Member institutions shall conduct their athletics 
programs for students who choose to participate in 
intercollegiate athletics as a part of their educational 
experience and in accordance with NCAA bylaws, thus 
maintaining a line of demarcation between student-athletes 
who participate in the Collegiate Model and athletes 
competing in the professional model.87 
This is followed by Article 12, “Amateurism and Athletics 
Eligibility,” which starts off with the following section with 
Bylaw 12.01, “General Principles.” 
12.01.1 Eligibility for Intercollegiate Athletics.  Only 
an amateur student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate 
athletics participation in a particular sport. 
12.01.2 Clear Line of Demarcation.  Member 
institutions’ athletics programs are designed to be an integral 
part of the educational program.  The student-athlete is 
considered an integral part of the student body, thus 
maintaining a clear line of demarcation between college 
athletics and professional sports. 
12.01.3 “Individual” vs. “Student-Athlete.”  NCAA 
amateur status may be lost as a result of activities prior to 
enrollment in college.  If NCAA rules specify that an 
“individual” may or may not participate in certain activities, 
this term refers to a person prior to and after enrollment in a 
member institution.  If NCAA rules specify a “student-
86. Id. at Principle 2.9, at 4.
87. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at xii.
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athlete,” the legislation applies only to that person’s 
activities after enrollment.88 
Few would complain about the foregoing NCAA’s 
commitment to amateurism in intercollegiate athletics and its 
rules to ensure common understanding of what defines an 
amateur and what does not.  Preserving amateurism in 
intercollegiate athletics is what draws many to watch and support 
it.  Collegiate sports is the last bastion of pure amateur sports 
before a few of these athletes make the jump to the professional 
ranks.  The NCAA’s commitment to amateurism allows most 
collegiate athletes to compete on a field that is not filled with paid 
athletes. 
However, in light of a typical career path of a tennis player 
with talents to compete at the highest collegiate level, is the no-
agent rule legally problematic and an unnecessary obstacle?  Can 
the rule be squared with the exceptions provided to tennis 
regarding prize money and baseball and hockey regarding agents 
and attorneys?  This analysis will begin with a basic survey of 
contract law implications of a child-athlete’s agreement with an 
agent, followed by a policy analysis in light of the highlighted 
legal challenges.  However, it is helpful to begin with a review of 
other writings on the topic. 
VII. CRITICAL REVIEWS OF NCAA ELIGIBILITY
RULES 
Several law journal articles have critiqued the no-agent rule 
in similar contexts as this Article, five of which are highlighted 
below.  All of them take various positions in their criticisms, and 
most of them focus on the rule’s impact on a particular sport.  In 
terms of court case precedent, three or four of the same cases 
repeatedly show up in most of these articles.  Notably, it is the 
Oliver v. NCAA decision, discussed in more detail later in this 
Article, that is most frequently mentioned.89 
Any serious inquiry into the NCAA’s no-agent rule must 
start with Professor Porto’s article, What Recruiter’s Don’t Tell 
Athletes and Athletes Don’t Think to Ask: A Critique of the 
88. Id. at Bylaw 12.01, at 61.
89. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E. 2d 203 (Ohio C.P. Erie Cty. 2009).
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NCAA’s Nonacademic Eligibility Rules.90  In addition to 
reviewing other NCAA Manual rules such as the “National Letter 
of Intent,” the “Transfer Rules,” and the “No Draft Rule,” the 
article provides a very plainspoken introduction to the “No-Agent 
Rule.”91  As the title suggests, the article would serve as a good 
reference for any college-bound athletes whose talents are 
inspiring them to test the waters for a potential professional 
career.  The article not only reviews the no-agent rule’s 
components—some of which are not intuitive to the casual sports 
fan—but it also discusses how the NCAA interprets the rule.92  
Also embedded in the article’s title is the reality that many 
talented young athletes who tread precariously close to NCAA 
rule violations are simply unaware of some of the traps for unwary 
that are highlighted in this Article. 
Another good primer for learning about the no-agent and 
related NCAA eligibility rules is Professor Richard Karcher’s 
article, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in 
the Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best 
Interest of the Amateur Athlete?93  This Article is the one of four 
discussed in this comment that evaluates the no-agent rule’s 
impact on baseball.94  However, Professor Karcher’s article is the 
only one that predates the Oliver decision.95  Professor Karcher’s 
article begins with a thorough but general survey of the rule and 
poses the question, “who is the NCAA trying to protect?”96  In 
doing so, Professor Karcher tees up the conundrum of the rule as 
it applies to all sports: if the NCAA is instituting the rule to protect 
athletes against exploitation, is the rule having the unintended 
impact of dissuading athletes from seeking assistance from 
90. See generally Brian L. Porto, What Recruiter’s Don’t Tell Athletes and Athletes 
Don’t Think to Ask: A Critique of the NCAA’s Nonacademic Eligibility Rules, 13 VA. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 240, 244 (2014).  
91. See id.
92. See generally id. at 259-65. 
93. Richard Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the 
Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 215 (2005). 
94. See id. at 216; Busby, supra note 6, at 140; Lockhart, supra note 6, at 179-80; 
Stross, supra note 6, at 170. 
95. See Karcher, supra note 92, at 216; Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio C.P.
Erie Cnty. 2009). 
96. Karcher, supra note 92, at 215-16. 
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available resources that can help shield them from such 
exploitation?97 
In The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring Amateurism, 
Matthew Stross also thoroughly surveys the no-agent rule and its 
role in the NCAA bylaws.98  He makes the case that the by-laws, 
in general, have already so badly blurred the lines between 
professionalism and amateurism that the no-agent rule is 
practically meaningless.99  His theme is that the rule does not 
advance the cause of preserving amateurism in intercollegiate 
athletics.100  While striking a dubious tone as to whether NCAA 
athletics are truly non-professional, he analyzes the issue through 
the unique lens of baseball and how high school players must be 
especially cautious of the no-agent rule when negotiating with a 
professional team.101 
Continuing the theme of how the no-agent rule impacts 
baseball, T. Matthew Lockhart takes a closer look at the Oliver 
ruling and analyzes what it portends for the future in Oliver v. 
NCAA: Throwing a Contractual Curveball at the NCAA’s “Veil 
of Amateurism.”102  Lockhart also uses baseball as a case study, 
not coincidentally since Oliver decision involved a major league’s 
baseball negotiations with a high school baseball player.103  From 
the contract angle, Lockhart finds support in Oliver for the theory 
that the prospective NCAA athlete is a third-party beneficiary of 
the “contract” between the NCAA and its member colleges and 
universities—the contract being the NCAA rules that regulate the 
athletic programs at member schools.104  As such, the prospective 
NCAA student athlete has standing to challenge the NCAA rules 
and would prevail if the court finds the rules arbitrary and 
capricious.105  Lockhart discusses how the Oliver court found the 
no-agent rule to be arbitrary and capricious, ruling in favor of 
restoring the baseball player’s collegiate eligibility.106 
97. See id.
98. See generally Stross, supra note 6, at 170.
99. See id. at 180-83.
100. See id. at 183-87. 
101. See id. at 183-84. 
102. See generally Lockhart, supra note 6.
103. See id. at 175-80. 
104. See id. at 188-89, 191. 
105. See id. at 188-89. 
106. See id. at 193. 
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In Playing for Love: Why the NCAA Rules Must Require a 
Knowledge-Intent Element to Affect the Eligibility of Student-
Athletes, J. Winston Busby focuses more generally on NCAA 
eligibility rules and uses football as an example in arguing that a 
prospective student-athlete should not be penalized for the NCAA 
violations or otherwise illegal activities of those acting at his or 
her behest if the athlete was not aware of these activities.107  The 
issue involved Cam Newton’s collegiate eligibility when it was 
determined his father had engaged in a pay-for-play marketing 
scheme in which he allegedly solicited money from boosters in 
exchange for his son’s commitment to play football at Auburn 
University.108  Busby surveys the NCAA eligibility process, 
highlighting the “restitution rule,” through which the NCAA 
holds member schools accountable, and the “reinstatement” 
process, which deals with the eligibility of individual athletes.109  
While this Article acknowledges that the challengers to NCAA 
rules have often been unsuccessful in courts on various theories, 
such as antitrust arguments, it ultimately concludes that the rules 
do not serve the individual athlete’s best interest when they 
penalize them for transgressions of which they had no knowledge 
or participation.110 
An interesting postscript to the review of these articles, 
particularly the ones focused on baseball, is that the NCAA 
bylaws instituted a change after their publication.  Bylaw 
12.3.1.1, titled “Exception—Baseball and Men’s Ice Hockey—
Prior to Full-Time Collegiate Enrollment,” allows baseball 
players to be represented by an agent or a lawyer during contract 
negotiations without losing their collegiate sports eligibility, so 
long as they, among other requirements, terminate the agency 
relationship prior to college enrollment.111  This rule was not 
present in the 2015-16 NCAA Manual, but it was included in all 
future versions.112  Without knowing exactly what precipitated 
107. J. Winston Busby, Playing for Love: Why the NCAA Rules Must Require a 
Knowledge-Intent Element to Affect the Eligibility of Student-Athletes, 42 CUMB. L. REV. 
135 (2012). 
108. See id. at 137-38. 
109. See id. at 150, 157-58. 
110. See id. at 178-80.
111. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.3.1.1, at 71.
112. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2016-2017 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, 
Bylaw 12.3.1.1, at 63 (2016); NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2017-2018 NCAA 
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the addition of this rule, it is interesting to note that the new 
exception postdated all five of the scholarly articles reviewed 
above and would fully permit the agent/attorney involvement that 
caused the rule violation in the Oliver case.113 
This Article builds on the common themes of these and other 
articles and attempts to critique the no agent rule via new avenues. 
This Article does not enter the fray of accusing the NCAA of 
being a money-making enterprise to the extent it is incapable of 
preserving amateurism, much like the Stross article reads.114  
However, it follows Stross’s theme that amateurism at the NCAA 
is indeed blurred, and more importantly, that a draconian rule like 
the no-agent rule no more erodes amateur status on the tennis 
courts than some of the other quasi-professional accommodations 
the NCAA rules makes for the sport.  Similar to the Lockhart 
article analysis,115 this article looks at the no-agent rule through 
the lens of contract law but adds a discussion of the third-party 
beneficiary concept from a different angle—that in which the 
prospective NCAA student athlete is a third-party beneficiary in 
the “contract” between a parent and an agent.  Continuing along 
the contract theme, this article also overlays the no-agent rule 
problem with the contract concepts of unconscionability and 
liberty to enter a contract. 
VIII. THE RALLY: THREE CONTRACT LAW
THEORIES 
A. Voiding the Agency Agreement?
A starting point in the contract law analysis is determining 
whether the prospective student-athlete has any chance of 
retroactively voiding their own or their parents’ agreement with 
the agent such that it is decided by the courts (and hopefully the 
NCAA) that the contract never existed.  In contract law parlance, 
a minor’s action of voiding a contract they entered is known as 
Dɪᴠɪsɪᴏɴ I Mᴀɴᴜᴀʟ, 71 (2017); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.3.1.1; NCAA 
MANUAL, 2019-2020, supra note 7, at Bylaw 12.3.1.1, at 72 (2019). 
113. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Stross, supra note 6. 
115. See generally Lockhart, supra note 6. 
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“disaffirmance,” whereas if an adult wants to negate a contract 
they entered, it is called “rescission.”116 
 If it is the prospective NCAA student-athlete tennis player 
who actually signed the contract, the questions are whether a 
“minor”—a person who has not reached the age of “majority,”117 
(eighteen in most states)118—can legally enter contracts and 
whether they can get out of contracts they have once entered. 
Contrary to a commonly held belief, a minor can legally enter into 
enforceable contracts.119  However, the contracts are voidable at 
their option, meaning that the minor, while still underage, may 
choose to revoke, or “disaffirm,” that contract.120  Courts have 
generally honored the request of minors who later decide to void 
their contracts, so long as the contract is not for “necessities.”121  
Voiding these contracts is only at the option for the minor and not 
for the contracting adult.122 
However, for the young tennis player, the idea of backing 
out of the contract with their agent is likely a non-sequitur.  First, 
116. See Harvey v. Hadfield, 372 P.2d 985, 986 (Utah 1962) (“Since time immemorial 
courts have quite generally recognized the justice and propriety of refusing to enforce 
contracts against minors, except for necessities. It is fair to assume that because of their 
immaturity they may lack the judgment, experience and will power which they should have 
to bind themselves to what may turn out to be burdensome and long-lasting obligations. 
Consequently, courts are properly solicitous of their rights and afford them protection from 
being taken advantage of by designing persons, and from their own imprudent acts, by 
allowing them to disaffirm contracts entered into during minority which upon more mature 
reflection they conclude are undesirable.”) 
117. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 6, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019).
118. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6500 (West 1992); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 2 
(McKinney 1974); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5101 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105 (2017). 
119. Harvey, 372 P.2d at 986.
120. See id.
121. See Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers, 172 S.E.2d 19, 20 (N.C. 1970).  There, 
Chief Justice Bobbitt quoted the following (in the original language) with approval: 
An early commentary on the common law, after the general statement that 
contracts made by persons (infants) before attaining the age of twenty-one 
“may be avoided,” sets forth “some exceptions out of this generality,” to wit: 
“An infant may bind himselfe to pay for his necessary meat, drinke, apparell, 
necessary physicke, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good 
teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe afterwards.” 
Id. at 20 (quoting COKE ON LITTLETON 172 (13th ed. 1788)); see also Valencia v. White, 
654 P.2d 287, 288-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of 
the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 
489 (1994) (“This narrow definition usually included ‘board, room, clothing, medical needs 
and education.’” (quoting Valencia, 654 P.2d at 289)). 
122. See DiMatteo, supra note 120, at 487. 
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the tennis player is probably not focused on what might happen if 
their tennis career fails to progress as they had hoped.  That is, the 
consideration of whether the agency agreement they or their 
parents just entered will imperil a collegiate tennis career is 
probably not first and foremost on their mind.123  It follows that if 
the legal status of entering such a contract is not on the young 
player’s mind, neither is the question whether there is anything 
they can do if they later decide the contract was not a good idea. 
Similarly, the adult parents of the player who enter the 
agency contract are also unlikely to consider those worst-case 
scenarios.  The “here and now” for both them and their child is 
trying to manage the career of a child with professional talents 
and aspirations.  Only if the parents were dissatisfied with the 
product they received in the agency agreement, or if they thought 
it was not worth their investment, would they consider backing 
out of the deal.124  Finally, the agents, like many businesses, are 
likely reticent to even allow minors to enter into these contracts 
to avoid the possibility of having a contract voided at the option 
of the minor.125 
However, the question of whether a minor tennis player can 
void an agency agreement is all predicated on the assumption 
such action would make a difference to the NCAA.  As a private 
organization, the NCAA typically enjoys significant deference 
from the courts.126  Further, their bylaws related to the interplay 
of agents and prospective NCAA student-athletes appear 
straightforward.  That is, “An individual shall be ineligible for 
participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed 
(orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose 
of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport” 
appears to be irrespective of whether the contract is later 
determined to be legally voided.127 
But what if it is the more likely scenario of the parent signing 
the agency agreement?  Would the minor tennis player have any 
123. See generally Lockhart, supra note 6, at 192-95. 
124. Id.
125. I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“It is the policy of the law to . . . discourage adults from contracting with an infant.”). 
126. See Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and 
Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 119 
(2008) (describing years of judicial deference toward the NCAA). 
127. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1. 
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legal recourse after the agency agreement relationship with their 
parents has ended and the tennis player realizes the consequence 
of not being able to play professional tennis?  That is, what if 
either Maria Genovese or Katerina Stewart or anyone similarly 
situated are on the precipice of signing to play tennis at the NCAA 
level and has third-person buyer’s remorse of their parent’s 
decision to enter that agency agreement?  This question requires 
a discussion of the contract concept of third-party beneficiaries. 
The previously cited Lockhart and Stross articles discuss the 
concept of third-party beneficiary status in the construct of the 
prospective collegiate athlete being the third-party beneficiary to 
the “contract” between the NCAA and its member school.128  
However, they do not examine the concept from the perspective 
of the minor athlete’s status vis-à-vis their parent’s contract with 
an agent.  For starters, a minor tennis player’s role in a contract 
between a parent and an agent is as close to the textbook 
definition of third-party beneficiary status as one could get.129  
The benefit to the parents entering the agency agreement is that 
they get advice and guidance on how to best navigate the 
uncharted waters of their child’s promising professional tennis 
career.130  They also get the benefits of the agent’s legwork, which 
includes actively managing the player’s career, helping determine 
which tournaments they should enter, and otherwise promoting 
and marketing the player’s brand.131  From the minor player’s 
perspective, they are the party who reaps the most tangible 
benefits of these efforts, and indeed they are the entire reason the 
128. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188-89, 191; Stross, supra note 6, at 174, 179.
129. For example, A and B enter into an agreement whereby A agrees to give valuable 
consideration to C, whereas A is the promisor, B is the promisee, and C is the beneficiary of 
the promise.  Third-party beneficiary law defines the rights of C to enforce the provisions of 
the contract between A and B.  See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 
774, at 727 (1952).  See also Gifford v. Corrigan, 22 N.E. 756, 758 (N.Y. 1889) (recovery 
by third-party beneficiary is based on equities of the transaction); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 
268, 269-75 (1859) (C may enforce contract where A paid $300 for B’s promise to pay C); 
Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 115 So. 94, 95 (Ala. 1927); Chung Kee v. Davidson, 36 
P. 519, 521 (Cal. 1894); Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540, 545 (1882); McNamee v. Withers, 37 
Md. 171, 179 (Md. 1872); Kaufman v. U.S. Nat’l Bank, 48 N.W. 738, 739 (Neb. 1891); 
Feldman v. McGuire, 55 P. 872, 873 (Or. 1899); Urquhart v. Brayton, 12 R.I. 169, 171-72 
(1878); Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 93 N.W. 440, 443 (Wis. 1903). 
130. See Ahiza Garcia, So You Want to Be a Sports Agent? Here’s What You Should 
Know, CNN MONEY (May 26, 2018), [https://perma.cc/NL9N-KANG]. 
131. Stacey B. Evans, Sports Agents: Ethical Representatives or Overly Aggressive 
Adversaries?, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 91, 91-92 (2010). 
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deal was entered.  It is their tennis career that is managed and 
promoted much like one would expect a sports agent to do. 
Could, then, a third-party beneficiary minor use their 
disaffirmance power to retroactively void a contract their parents 
entered when they were a minor?  That remedy is probably not 
likely for a couple of reasons.  First, the question of third-party 
beneficiary rights usually turns on whether the third party could 
sue the principal of a contract for non-performance of their end of 
the bargain.132  An example situation in the tennis agency realm 
is when the minor tennis player feels the agent is not upholding 
his end of the deal, and the minor’s parents are unable or 
unwilling to force this issue.  In that situation, the legal question 
is whether the third-party’s interests in the contract have 
“vested.”133  If those interests have vested, the minor tennis player 
would have standing to enforce the contract; if they have not, then 
the minor would not have standing.134  However, it is unlikely the 
courts would entertain a case where the minor third-party 
beneficiary can disaffirm the contract because, as a third-party 
beneficiary, they are not actually considered a party to the 
contract, from a legal perspective.135 
The second problem is that even if it were the parents who 
signed the contract and they wanted to rescind the contract, a 
retroactive rescission would not likely be allowed because, in 
most of these situations, the contractual duties are no longer 
present; that is the contractual duties for both parties have been 
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
133. There are three classes of third-party beneficiaries: “(a) a donee beneficiary if it 
appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the 
purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof is 
to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some 
performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the 
beneficiary; (b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of 
the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the promise will 
satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of 
the beneficiary against the promisee which has been barred by the statute of Limitations or 
by a discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds; (c) 
an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in Clause (a) nor those stated in Clause 
(b) exist.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
134. See Gifford, 22 N.E. at 757.
135. The Restatement’s defining of the types of third-party beneficiaries is to help 
discern whether the third-party, who is not a party to the contract and thus ordinarily not able 
to demand enforcement of it, can nonetheless do so if they are the correct type of third-party 
beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133.  
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satisfied, or “discharged.”136  If that is the case, then the contract 
does not technically exist anymore.137  Thus, it is extremely 
difficult to rescind a contract for which both parties have already 
fulfilled their obligations.  Most states have time periods by which 
a party or parties can rescind the contract, and if both parties have 
fulfilled their contractual duties, the most likely route to rescind 
would be if both parties mutually agree to rescind.138  For a player 
or parents who have buyer’s remorse long after the contract is 
entered, it is unlikely the agent will agree to give their money back 
and even more unlikely a court could find a mutually acceptable 
way to make both parties whole. 
From the NCAA’s perspective, the analysis of whether it is 
possible for a sports agency contract to be retroactively rescinded 
by the parent or minor may be for naught.  That is, even if the 
parties were to mutually agree to rescind the contract or if a court 
ordered rescission as a contract dispute remedy, would that matter 
to the NCAA?  The NCAA’s directive seems quite clear: “if he or 
she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an 
agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or 
reputation in that sport.”139  Thus, even if a court ordered 
rescission of a contract and put the world on notice that the 
contract once entered by the two parties is no longer, would the 
NCAA rule, as written, still be violated? 
As a private organization, the NCAA enjoys the advantage 
of autonomy, operated separately from publicly funded 
universities, as well as the corresponding deference by the 
courts.140  Thus, unless a court decision or order directly relates 
to a contract the NCAA entered into, which is not the case here, 
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235.
137. See id.
138. See generally New York Tel. Co. v. Jamestown Tel. Corp., 26 N.E.2d 295, 297-
98 (N.Y. 1940); Capstone Enters. v. Cty. of Westchester, 691 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999); Adrian Family Partners v. ExxonMobil Corp., 878 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2009) (citing New York state interpretation of the right to rescind a contract and the 
difficulty in doing so 1) after the contract benefits have been accepted, and 2) if the intent to 
rescind is not made clear in a prompt manner: “[A] plaintiff waive[s] its right to  seek 
rescission of the . . . agreement by failing to promptly seek rescission after accepting the 
benefits of that agreement”).  See also Megan Bittakis, The Time Should Begin to Run When 
the Deed Is Done: A Proposed Solution to Problems in Applying Limitations Periods to the 
Rescission of Contracts, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 755, 759-60 (2010).  
139. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1. 
140. See Mitten & Davis, supra note 125, at 119.
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the NCAA is not directly impacted by the legal ramifications of 
the court ruling and could decide for itself whether to change its 
stance because of a prospective collegiate athlete’s previous, but 
now voided, agency relationship.141  Based on the NCAA’s 
articulated commitment to amateurism and their clearly worded 
prohibition of an agreement with an agent,142 valid contract or not, 
it is unlikely such a scenario would provide a prospective NCAA 
student athlete relief in the eyes of the NCAA. 
The foregoing illustrates why an effort by a prospective 
collegiate athlete to dissociate from a previous agent arrangement 
presents more potential pitfalls than opportunities for success. 
The argument that the no-agent rule fails under an arbitrary and 
capricious standard seems more destined for success. 
The better approach for finding a legal remedy if a 
prospective NCAA student-athlete has fallen victim to the no-
agent rule is to explore the third-party beneficiary relationship 
theory in the same manner as the previous writings and court 
cases.143  That is, the prospective NCAA student-athlete is a third-
party beneficiary of the “contract” between the NCAA and the 
member schools it regulates.  This would open the door to 
achieving standing, or the legal status of being able to challenge 
the rule in our court system.144  Once standing is obtained, the 
three best remedies to explore would be obtaining a legal 
determination that the no-agent rule: (1) is arbitrary and 
capricious, (2) is unconscionable, or (3) improperly interferes 
with the liberty to contract.145 
B. An Arbitrary and Capricious Rule?
The NCAA bylaws, including the no-agent rule, give the 
NCAA an extremely lopsided bargaining position when it comes 
to a collegiate athlete’s eligibility.146  The NCAA sets the terms 
141. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1. 
142. Id. at xii & 71.
143. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188-91; Stross, supra note 6, at 174, 179.
144. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188-89 (discussing the theory under which a 
student-athlete could establish standing as a third-party beneficiary in the contract between 
the NCAA and its member schools).   
145. See id. at 189; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST.
1981); Mitten & Davis, supra note 125, at 120. 
146. See Stross, supra note 6, at 178, 190.
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for intercollegiate athletic teams and, as a private organization, 
the NCAA can set the rules as it wishes so long as they do not 
otherwise violate the law.147  Thus, for the prospective collegiate 
athlete, it is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.  That is, if they want 
to compete at the Division I level, they must abide by the NCAA’s 
rules.  According to the NCAA, the necessity for these rules is to 
preserve the demarcation between collegiate and professional 
athletics.148 
Enter the arbitrary and capricious contract theory.149  Under 
an arbitrary and capricious analysis, one could first look at 
whether the stated goals of the NCAA necessitate the 
enforcement of its rules.150  The goal of “retain[ing] a clear line 
of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports”151 is the obvious thrust of many of these rules.  At first 
glance, the no-agent rule seems to correlate well with the 
NCAA’s principle that “student-athletes should be protected from 
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”152  
After all, what universities and colleges would want agents 
lurking about campus to solicit contract deals with elite college 
athletes? 
But the no-agent rule reaches deeper than that and regulates 
the contractual activities of athletes before they even set foot on 
campus.153  Further, the no-agent rule is not seemingly attempting 
to disqualify prospective NCAA student-athletes who have 
engaged in criminal or other morally repugnant activity prior to 
playing sports for their college in a way that some university 
147. See Rachel Blechman, Student Challenges to Academic Decisions (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Stetson University College of Law) (citing Sharick v. Se. U. of 
Health Scis., Inc., 780 So.2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)) (supporting the concept that 
courts normally do not substitute their judgment for the professional judgment of academic 
institutions, unless there is bad faith or an arbitrary or capricious judgment rendered by the 
institution) [https://perma.cc/9H3Z-NUQH]. 
148. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at xii. 
149. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188, n.85 (citing the doubts expressed in Mitten & 
Davis, supra note 125, at 121, about success in challenging NCAA eligibility rules given 
these challenges’ lack of success in the courts, but noting that article was written prior to the 
Oliver decision).   
150. See Busby, supra note 6, at 163 (quoting Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 214 
(Ohio C.P. Erie Cnty. 2009)) (stating that “the NCAA’s amateurism rules furthered an 
‘unreliable (capricious) and illogical (arbitrary)’ purpose”). 
151. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, Const. art. 1.3.1, at 1.
152. Id. at Principle 2.9, at 4.
153. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 176-77.
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admissions departments might take issue to a prospective 
student’s prior illegal drug use.  Signing an agency agreement is 
a completely legal action and a prudent one.  It is merely the 
athlete or parent exercising their right to contract a mutually 
beneficial service.154 
In terms of tennis, it is dubious at best, whether the no-agent 
rule serves any of the NCAA’s stated purposes.  First, one needs 
to look no further than the exceptions the bylaws grant to tennis 
for players’ acceptance of prize money at tournaments, both 
before and while competing in intercollegiate tennis.155  While the 
bylaws set limits on the prize amount that can be pocketed to 
retain eligibility, this exception is an obvious accommodation to 
the reality that collegiate-caliber tennis players in their mid-teens 
are often entering and advancing in tournaments that hand out 
cash prize money.156  The general formula is that if a tennis 
player’s prize winnings do not exceed their expenses for the 
tournaments they enter, their collegiate eligibility is preserved.157  
This is in addition to the first $10,000 of prize money per year the 
player can keep, unconditionally.158  While the expenses portion 
of this equation cannot include anything other than the individual 
player’s expenses,159 such as expenses incurred by coaches or 
parents, this is not a difficult criterion to meet.  Most players 
outside of the top 100 players in the world are not making more 
money than they are spending, given the expense of travel, 
lodging, and food at the various tournaments around the United 
States and worldwide.160  Bottom line, it is a rare occasion where 
a tennis player who has never cracked the world top 100 in 
ranking would be deemed ineligible for collegiate play based on 
this rule alone.161 
The foregoing analysis illustrates how the no-agent rule fails 
to even have a distant effect on the amateur status of a prospective 
student-athlete tennis player.  As previously mentioned, tennis 
154. See Stross, supra note 6, at 189-90.
155. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2, at 66.
156. See id.; see also 2019 ITF MEN’S & WOMEN’S REGULATIONS, supra note 19, at 
14, 52, 73, 117-18.  
157. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2.1, at 66. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
161. See Waldstein, Thousands Play On, supra note 32.
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players with the skills and talents to compete at either the 
collegiate or professional level are competing in tournaments at a 
young age.162  They do so to improve their skills enough to remain 
competitive for collegiate scholarships, should they choose the 
collegiate route, and to be able to compete against other 
professionals, should they decide to forgo college.  Indeed, the 
tournaments themselves are good litmus tests for the tennis player 
to determine whether they have the right stuff to compete in either 
elite collegiate tennis or in the professional ranks.  The players 
are also winning cash-prize earnings in these tournaments, 
depending on how far they advance.163  Bottom line, college-
bound tennis players are playing for compensation, just like 
professionals, prior to and while competing in intercollegiate 
tennis.  According to the NCAA bylaws, this professional activity 
does not disqualify a tennis player from NCAA athletics so long 
as the money earned is within the limits prescribed.164 
To summarize, if as discussed above, the no-agent rule fails 
to even indirectly address the purpose and achieve the results for 
which the rule has been promulgated and enforced, then it is easy 
to see how a court might conclude the rule is arbitrary and 
capricious.  In the Oliver case, Judge Tone opined, “Bylaw 
12.3.2.1 is unreliable (capricious) and illogical (arbitrary) and 
indeed stifles what attorneys are trained and retained to do.”165  
Within the context of tennis, the foregoing analysis paints a strong 
case for how the rule is unreliable and illogical in the NCAA’s 
efforts preserve the amateur nature of collegiate athletics. 
C. An Unconscionable Result?
The third-party beneficiary analysis can also lead us to a 
discussion of contract unconscionability.  That is, the prospective 
tennis player who has violated the no-agent rule could make a 
case that the no-agent rule, itself, yields unconscionable contract 
results.  A court would deem a contract unconscionable if it is so 
one-sided that the unfairness to one of the parties is beyond what 
162. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
164. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2, at 66.
165. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 214 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
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the court would deem as fair dealing.166  There are two types of 
unconscionability for contracts: procedural and substantive.167  A 
court may find a contract is procedurally unconscionable when 
there are such inequalities in age, maturity, or intelligence 
between the contracting parties that it gives them vastly different 
relative bargaining power.168  Substantive unconscionability 
occurs when a court determines that the terms of the contract are 
so overly harsh or one-sided that the most equitable remedy is not 
to enforce it.169 
In the case of the prospective NCAA student-athlete tennis 
player, it would not be difficult to assert a claim of 
unconscionability of both varieties.  First, there is an agency 
contract that the minor tennis player probably does not personally 
sign, most likely does not understand, and in some cases, does not 
even know about.170  Second, the parents have entered the 
agreement with the best of intentions, hoping to help themselves 
manage the advancement of their child’s tennis talent.  Indeed, 
the NCAA’s bylaws goal of preventing exploitation by 
commercial interests could be the very reason the parents decide 
to hire an agent.171  Finally, when the minor tennis player feels 
their talents or life goals will be enriched and fulfilled by 
attending college and playing NCAA tennis, the NCAA deems 
that the existence of the agency relationship renders the player 
166. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (Aᴍ. Lᴀᴡ. INST. & UNIF. Lᴀᴡ Cᴏᴍᴍ’ɴ 2017) (providing “(1) 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so 
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.  (2) 
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contractor any clause thereof may be 
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as 
to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination”).  
The Official Comments to U.C.C. § 2-302 further clarify how a court would test for 
unconscionability by stating: “The basic test is whether, in the light of the general 
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses 
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the 
time of the making of the contract. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of oppression 
and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior 
bargaining power.”  Id. at cmt. 1 (citation omitted).   
167. See M. Neil Browne & Lauren Biksacky, Unconscionability and the Contingent 
Assumptions of Contract Theory, 2013 Mɪᴄʜ. Sᴛ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 211, 219 (2013).  
168. See id. at 222-23. 
169. See id. at 220-21.
170. Busby, supra note 6, at 139.
171. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Principle 2.9, at 4. 
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disqualified from NCAA competition.172  To say that it is 
procedurally unconscionable for the NCAA to penalize a 
prospective collegiate athlete because of something they could 
not control, or did not even know about, is not a farfetched 
argument. 
In light of the substantive unconscionability theory, it is also 
not difficult to make the argument that such a contract’s terms are 
overly harsh or oppressive.173  For this type of unconscionability, 
the victims in this case are both the school and the athlete.  For 
the athlete, the revocation of the freedom to sign an agreement to 
play sports at any NCAA institution is an overbroad penalty for a 
prospective student-athlete who probably was not involved in the 
agency contract.  For the NCAA member school, the terms of 
their contract with the NCAA prevent them from ever being able 
to sign a student to play tennis at their institution after there was 
much work done in recruitment and candidate file assessment to 
conclude that the prospective NCAA student-athlete is the right 
fit for their school.174 
With the NCAA and member school contract so vulnerable 
to a challenge under both unconscionable contract theories, it 
would appear to be in the NCAA’s best interest to adjust the rule. 
The unconscionability of the rule in grossly limiting the member 
schools and the athlete also points to another contracting principle 
that should give the NCAA pause about keeping the no-agent 
rule: the liberty to contract. 
D. No Liberty to Contract?
There is a basic constitutional law concept of freedom to 
contract.  The idea of liberty of contract evolved from the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  First mentioned 
in the Slaughter House cases, the Allgeyer et al. v. Louisiana case 
concluded the following about the liberty to contract: 
The “liberty” mentioned in that [Fourteenth] 
amendment means, not only the right of the citizen to be free 
172. Id. at Bylaw 12.3.1, at 71.
173. Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit 
Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 946 (1986). 
174. See Interview with Paul Peck, supra note 72; Navaroli, supra note 76. 
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from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by 
incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of 
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to 
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where 
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue 
any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into 
all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to 
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes 
above mentioned.175 
This precedent and concept of the liberty to contract drew 
much support in the years after this case, as the Supreme Court 
struck down legislation that was thought to improperly impede an 
individual’s or business’s freedom to contract.176 
Denying a prospective tennis player the ability to sign a 
commitment to play tennis at a NCAA regulated school because 
of a previous agency agreement could also be said to encroach on 
that player’s liberty to contract.  The NCAA is restricting the 
player’s ability to contract with the entire class of NCAA 
regulated colleges and universities simply because of the previous 
contractual agreement.177  It would be one thing if the NCAA’s 
prohibition of contracting with a school was for a practical reason, 
such as prohibiting a prospective NCAA student-athlete from 
signing agreements to play at two or more schools.  However, that 
is not what the NCAA is trying to prevent with the no-agent rule; 
consequently, the rule does not seem to have a practical or logical 
result.  That is, the NCAA is restricting the player’s ability to 
contract simply because of an agreement they may not have even 
personally signed when they were a minor.178 
The survey of these four contract remedies for the 
prospective tennis player deemed ineligible from NCAA 
competition because of the no-agent rule admittedly reveal 
various chances for success.  On the one hand, the discussion of 
potentially voiding an agency contract to undo the damage it did 
to the potential NCAA career is a stretch, based on the reasons 
discussed.  The other three theories rely on a legal determination 
that the prospective player is a third-party beneficiary of the 
175. Allgeyer et al. v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
176. See John Raeburn Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 497, 507 (1942).
177. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1. 
178. Busby, supra note 6, at 149-50.
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contract between the NCAA and its member schools, which has 
been found to exist by the courts.179 
There is reason to believe we have reached a tipping point 
for the NCAA’s no-agent rule.  The sum of the other three 
possible legal remedies, coupled with courts’ lean towards 
entertaining those theories, suggests an environment where the 
no-agent rule will struggle to survive.  As discussed in the next 
section, courts are not only starting to find that prospective 
collegiate tennis players do have legal relationships with the 
NCAA in the realm of a third-party beneficiary, but at least one 
of these court opinions also found that the no-agent rule is indeed 
an arbitrary and capricious rule.180 
IX. IN THE COURTS OF LAW: CLOSE TO AN
OVERRULE? 
As discussed in some of the previous writings about NCAA 
eligibility rules, there have been several relevant challenges of 
those rules in the courts.  Certain legal theories such as suggesting 
the NCAA rules violate antitrust laws have largely been 
fruitless.181  However, other challengers of the rules have at least 
succeeded in getting the court to hear their cases that argue the 
rules fail under the arbitrary and capricious theory.182  Those 
judicial decisions have supported the notion that the prospective 
student-athlete is a third-party beneficiary to the contract between 
the NCAA and its member schools, thus giving the students the 
requisite standing to even bring such a challenge.  A survey of 
these cases is instructive. 
In Banks v. NCAA, a Notre Dame football player attempted 
to reinstate his final year of collegiate eligibility after he had 
entered the NFL draft.183  The theory of his case was that the 
NCAA and its rules created an anticompetitive market in 
violation of federal antitrust rules.184  In ruling for the NCAA, the 
Court stated Banks failed to “allege an anti-competitive impact 
179. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188-89.
180. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
181. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1992).
182. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 214 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009); Bloom v. 
NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2004). 
183. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1083.
184. Id. at 1084.
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on a discernible market” and correspondingly dismissed Banks’s 
claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.”185  The court ruling was quite supportive of the NCAA’s 
commitment to amateurism and agreed the rules helped the 
organization serve that purpose.  They suggested that complete 
abdication of even some of those rules—a potential had Banks 
prevailed—”would turn amateur intercollegiate athletics into a 
sham because the focus of college football would shift from 
educating the student-athlete to creating a ‘minor league’ farm 
system out of college football . . . .”186 
Gaines v. NCAA, a similar antitrust challenge, was levied by 
a Vanderbilt football recruit.187  Both Banks and Gaines sought 
injunctive relief to prevent the NCAA from enforcing their rules, 
at least for their unique circumstances.188  The Gaines court 
similarly defended the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism and 
held that Gaines would have to overcome an “especially heavy 
burden” to convince the Court that injunctive relief could square 
with the NCAA’s commitments.189  The Court ultimately held 
that the NCAA bylaws were outside the reach of Sherman Anti-
Trust jurisdiction.190 
The Banks and Gaines cases have two important distinctions 
from the circumstances of our case studies, Maria Genovese and 
Katerina Stewart.  First, both football players knew at the time 
that they were violating NCAA rules that would render them 
ineligible to further compete in college football.191  Maria and 
Katerina did not know, at the time, their actions would violate 
NCAA eligibility rules.  In fact, they were not even members of 
an NCAA regulated organization at the time of their 
infractions.192  Second, both cases involved athletes crossing the 
professional line (entering the draft) which rendered them 
185. See id. at 1094.
186. Id. at 1091.
187. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
188. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1992); Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at
741. 
189. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 742.
190. Id. at 744-45. 
191. See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1083-84; Gaines, 746 F.Supp. at 740.
192. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 187 (noting that student-athletes are regulated by 
some of the NCAA eligibility rules even before they are members of an NCAA regulated 
institution and juxtaposing that concept against the fact that the NCAA enjoys great 
deference from the courts in its status as a private organization). 
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ineligible to return to collegiate play.193  For Maria, Katerina, and 
other tennis players, this scenario plays out all the time in that pre-
collegiate players often enter professional tournaments, whether 
declaring or not, and the NCAA rules are amenable to such 
activity. 
Bloom v. NCAA and Oliver v. NCAA are relevant cases in 
that they both entertained claims against NCAA eligibility rules 
based on third-party standing theory.194  Bloom also involved a 
football player who had not entered the professional ranks in 
football, but had competed professionally in skiing, thus running 
afoul of NCAA football eligibility for endorsement arrangements 
while engaged in skiing.195  The Court ruled against Bloom in 
finding that the NCAA rules rationally related to their legitimate 
purpose of maintaining the demarcation between collegiate and 
professional sports.196  However, the Court entertained his 
argument after determining he had standing to challenge the 
NCAA bylaws as a third-party beneficiary.197 
The Oliver court also supported the third-party standing 
claim and even ruled in favor of the NCAA rule challenger on the 
merits of his argument.198  This case involved a baseball player 
who was found ineligible for NCAA baseball competition 
because he had his attorney present when negotiating a potential 
contract with the Minnesota Twins Major League Baseball 
organization.199  The NCAA does not have a per-se “no-attorney” 
rule, but attorneys are still forbidden from attending these types 
of negotiations.200  The Court ruled in favor of Oliver to the 
delight of NCAA eligibility rule antagonists under the theory that 
the rule was arbitrary and capricious and not rationally related to 
the stated goals of preserving amateurism in intercollegiate 
athletics.201  The Court found it quite paradoxical that in trying to 
protect prospective student-athletes from exploitation, it forbids 
193. See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1083-84; Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 740.
194. See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 623-24 (Colo. App. 2004); Oliver v. NCAA, 
920 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009). 
195. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622.
196. Id. at 626.
197. Id. at 623-24. 
198. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 211-12.
199. Id. at 206-07. 
200. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.3.2.1.
201. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 215-16. 
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them from having competent representation at the time the athlete 
most needed it.202 
While the Oliver case represented a monumental victory for 
student-athletes challenging NCAA bylaws that appear to be 
tangentially, at best, related to the goal of preserving amateurism, 
the Court’s decision was ultimately vacated due to a settlement 
between Oliver and the NCAA, which included lifting a court 
injunction prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing the rule.203  Still, 
the case gives some hope to those who have fallen victim to an 
NCAA rule violation, such as the no-agent rule, because it is yet 
another case that held the prospective NCAA student-athletes 
have standing to challenge the rules, and it found that the 
challenger prevailed on the merits of an arbitrary and capricious 
claim.204 
X. IN THE COURTS OF PUBLIC POLICY:
UNFORCED ERRORS 
Before delving into the policy challenges of the NCAA no-
agent rule, a quick review of our case studies is in order.205  Maria 
Genovese and Katerina Stewart were on-the-rise tennis stars 
whose parents had entered agency agreements on their behalf. 
The parents’ motives were completely benign, acting in the best 
interests of their daughters.  Both Maria and Katerina hit a 
juncture in their careers where they decided to go to college and 
compete at the NCAA level.  Both had the skills to be a part of an 
elite NCAA program.  Neither knew at the time of their agency 
agreement that they would end up pursuing collegiate tennis. 
Maria’s pursuit was driven by the fact that injuries during her 
junior tennis years impeded her development to be a consistent 
winner at the professional level.  Katerina wanted to both play 
tennis and serve her country in the military; West Point was the 
perfect fit.  Neither knew that having signed the agency 
agreement rendered them ineligible for collegiate competition 
until they reached the life event of entering college.  Maria lost 
202. See id. at 214.
203. See Busby, supra note 6, at 163-64.
204. See Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 212, 215-16. 
205. See supra Part IV.
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her appeals with the NCAA.206  Katerina withdrew from the U.S. 
Military Academy Preparatory School when advised that her 
appeal to the NCAA would be difficult to win.207  Maria simply 
could not afford to enroll in college without some type of 
scholarship.  For Katerina, standing on the sidelines her entire 
college career was too much to bear; her talents beckoned her 
back on the tour of the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) 
where she is back to 282 in the world and playing in the minor 
leagues again.208 
B. Tennis Players and Their Agents: It’s All Part of the
Business! 
This article does not intend to portray tennis agents as having 
nefarious motives while preying upon young tennis players 
simply trying to make some money off their talents.  However, to 
be sure, these agents are engaged in a business enterprise and will 
seek out clients who they think have the potential to make money 
in the professional ranks.  It is in their best interests to enter into 
agreements that will be mutually beneficial: the tennis player gets 
the direction they need to advance their career while the agent 
gets the payment and reputation of helping make it happen given 
his good judgment and years of expertise. 
Additionally, the agents are an extension of tennis coaches, 
working on the player’s career issues and reallocating that time to 
the coach in order to develop the player’s game.209  Indeed, the 
lower ranked player’s paid coaches (and parents) are also their de 
facto agents, and there is certainly no NCAA rule forbidding a 
collegiate tennis recruit from having ever paid a coach in their 
career. 
Further, the agents are not obligated to warn the developing 
tennis player that using their services will most likely disqualify 
her from collegiate competition,210 and even if they did, the player 
206. Telephone interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53. 
207. Interview with Katerina Stewart, supra note 72.
208. See Players: Katerina Stewart, ITF, [https://perma.cc/53XD-UVCM] (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2019), for Katerina Stewart’s profile and current ranking. 
209. Maryann Hudson & Elliott Almond, They Play by Their Own Rules: Colleges: 
Sports Agents Are Everywhere, and the NCAA Estimates 70% of Current Athletes Have Had 
Contact with Them, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 1995), [https://perma.cc/6YR2-MNP8]. 
210. See REVISED UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
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is probably not focused on that eventuality.  Thus, this Article is 
not intended to paint the agents as the bad guys in these scenarios; 
they certainly have interests, as do both parties in this equation. 
This leads us to an examination of the prudence of the NCAA’s 
no-agent policy and whether it is serving the NCAA, the agents, 
or the players with the intent for which it was conceived. 
C. Unforced Errors: Inconsistent Policy
The NCAA bylaw exceptions that accommodate 
professional activity reveal that the NCAA does not consider 
tournament play—some of which pits prospective college players 
against seasoned professionals—and the prize money awarded at 
tournaments to cross the line of demarcation between collegiate 
and professional sports.211  The obvious question is then, how 
would the prospective student-athlete’s (or their parent’s) hiring 
of an agent cause that line to be crossed?  For Maria Genovese or 
Katerina Stewart, the prize money acceptance was not what 
doomed their collegiate tennis career; the no-agent rule did.212  
The hiring of an agent does not guarantee you have, or will attain, 
the earnings required to harm your eligibility under the rule; in 
some cases you may, in others you may not.  Thus, we can 
disassociate the NCAA no-agent rule from the NCAA limits on 
the acceptance of the prize money.213  It is therefore logical that 
the NCAA can retain or remove one rule without harming the 
purpose of the other.  In this situation, the recommendation would 
be to eliminate the no-agent rule due to its lack of correlation with 
the professional earnings exception of the NCAA bylaws. 
D. Legal-Policy: Legal Headwinds Beg for Policy
Change 
A key reason for recommending changes to the NCAA no-
agent rule is not just that it is misguided policy, but that it is so 
fraught with potential legal challenges identified in this Article 
that it seems only a matter of time before those legal disputes 
persuade the NCAA to make accommodations.  Even with the 
211. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.1.2.4, at 66.
212. See id. at 63, 66, 71.
213. See id. 
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typical deference yielded to the NCAA as a private organization, 
the courts may end up granting relief from the no-agent rule on 
an individual basis often enough for the NCAA to realize the 
exceptions start swallowing up the rule.  As discussed above, a 
tennis player who previously signed, or whose parents signed, an 
agency contract may find it difficult to retroactively disaffirm that 
agreement and successfully doing so might not even make a 
difference in terms of satisfying the NCAA rules.214  But with 
strong arguments about the arbitrary and capricious and 
potentially unconscionable nature of the no-agent rule, the NCAA 
may find itself on the losing end of future challenges.  The Oliver 
case shows that the NCAA no-agent rule may already be on shaky 
ground and is not immune from a court challenge.215 
But even if the NCAA staves off legal challenges of its 
bylaws in the future, the mere fact that the no-agent rule puts 
prospective tennis players in these legal binds suggests that a 
policy change would be prudent.  Maria Genovese and Katerina 
Stewart are not the last tennis talents to find themselves in a 
position where they unwittingly sacrificed their collegiate 
eligibility.  For every player who enlisted the support of an agent, 
there are others who decided to forgo the advice of an agent just 
to preserve amateurism because they knew of the risks.  Even if 
the NCAA better educates and forewarns its prospective tennis 
players that hiring an agent will render them ineligible for 
collegiate competition, or even if every player were to read 
Professor Porto’s article to become better informed,216 does the 
sport of tennis really want to foster that dynamic?  Would it not 
be better to allow tennis players or their parents to become better 
informed by hiring an expert in the field rather than further 
cultivating the often-unseen minefield of agency violations? 
XI. MATCH POINT: PROPOSED CHANGES
Based on the legal and policy issues highlighted in this 
Article, it is high time for the NCAA to remove the no-agent rule, 
at least for the sport of tennis.  Perhaps the arguments posed will 
move the NCAA to remove the rule for other or all sports, but for 
214. See DiMatteo, supra note 120, at 486-88; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
215. See Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E. 2d 203, 214 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
216. See generally Porto, supra note 89. 
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now it is clear that the rule fails to serve the amateurism interests 
of the NCAA, disadvantages rising stars in the tennis world, and 
is fraught with potential legal and policy inconsistencies.  At 
minimum, the no-agent rule causes the NCAA to abdicate its 
responsibility to engage in fair dealing with all parties with which 
it enjoys a contractual relationship.217 
Empathetic to the NCAA’s main goal of preserving 
amateurism in intercollegiate sports,218 the no-agent rule should 
still apply to tennis players for as long as they are enrolled in an 
NCAA regulated institution.  To allow otherwise would infest 
colleges and university with agents trying to exploit the talents of 
collegiate athletes.  This would not serve the interests of the 
member universities and would run directly counter to the 
NCAA’s goals of avoiding such athlete exploitation.  Indeed, it 
would make a mockery of amateur intercollegiate athletics, and 
collegiate tennis coaches would not want to tolerate such activity. 
For tennis, however, allowing aspiring young tennis players 
who are already competing in tournaments and winning money to 
hire an agent will not cause the athlete from crossing some 
imaginary line making them an irrevocable professional.  The 
NCAA should keep the current rules allowing for retention of 
amateur status if the player’s tournament winnings do not exceed 
actual expenses219—this is the true mark of whether a player is 
engaged in the sport as a professional and would provide an 
adequately clear demarcation line for whether an aspiring young 
tennis player has crossed the line from amateur to professional. 
Turning back to our case studies, Maria Genovese and 
Katarina Stewart, the amateur nature of college tennis would not 
have collapsed had they signed with their respective schools and 
played NCAA tennis.220  At these universities, they would have 
been playing with and against other women just like them: those 
players that trained for tennis from a young age, played in junior 
tournaments, trained at an elite tennis academy, and flirted with 
the prospect of forgoing college to join the hard grind in the 
professional ranks.  These two players were unable to play NCAA 
tennis because they had one thing different than their counterparts 
217. See Oliver, 920 N.E. 2d at 212.
218. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, Const. art. 1.3.1, at 1.
219. See id. at 63, 66.
220. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 63, 66, 71.
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in college tennis: they had hired an agent or otherwise signed an 
endorsement deal.  If, as recommended, the no-agent rule 
remained in place for their time at university, their schools would 
not have turned into a feeding frenzy for agents seeking to pluck 
them out of their college tennis environment and actively 
marketing their skills while still competing as an amateur. 
What is even more telling about their stories is what they are 
doing now: Katerina Stewart is plodding away back in the tennis 
minor leagues221 and Maria Genovese is competing in collegiate 
tennis for a school not governed by NCAA rules.222  Katerina is 
back with her original crowd of prospective collegiate and 
professional tennis players223 and Maria is competing with 
collegiate athletes.224  Both would still be eligible for NCAA 
tennis at this point if were not for the no-agent rule. 
221. Florida’s Katerina Stewart Wins USTA Pro Circuit Naples Title, USTA Fʟᴀ.
(May 21, 2019), [https://perma.cc/D3JL-TWSP] [hereinafter Stewart Wins UTSA]. 
222. 2019-20 Women’s Tennis Roster, supra note 66.
223. See Stewart Wins UTSA, supra note 220. 
224. 2019-20 Women’s Tennis Roster, supra note 66.
